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Is Modern Technology Responsible for Jobless Recoveries?
By Georg Graetz and Guy Michaels∗
Since the early 1990s, recoveries from re-
cessions in the US have been plagued by
weak employment growth. Employment
growth during the two years after each re-
cession’s trough was a little over five per-
cent before 1990, and just under one per-
cent since then (Gali, Smets and Wouters,
2012). One possible explanation for the
slower recovery of jobs is related to tech-
nological change. Middle-skill jobs, often
involving routine tasks that are particularly
susceptible to replacement by new technolo-
gies, might be destroyed permanently dur-
ing recessions. The displaced workers are
then forced into time-consuming transitions
to different occupations and sectors, result-
ing in slow job growth during the recovery.
This explanation has been proposed, along
with empirical evidence, by Jaimovich and
Siu (2014), and we confirm that it fits the
employment patterns in the US. But we
also examine whether this mechanism is at
work in the rest of the developed world: la-
bor market polarization (or “hollowing out”
of middle-skill jobs) has been documented
in the US as much as in other countries,
and there is evidence that technology is one
of the drivers of this change (Goos, Man-
ning and Salomons, 2014; Michaels, Natraj
and Van Reenen, 2014). Our main research
question is therefore: could modern tech-
nology also be contributing to jobless re-
coveries across developed economies?
In order to examine technology’s role
in employment recoveries from recessions,
we use data on 71 recessions, which took
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place in 17 developed countries from 1970-
2011.1 We use both aggregate data and
harmonized data on 28 industries within
each of these countries. We investigate
how recoveries changed since the late 1980s,
and whether these changes are likely at-
tributable to technological change.
First, we examine whether recoveries
from recessions after 1985 produced slower
employment growth than earlier recover-
ies. Second, we test whether industries
that make more intensive use of routine
jobs, and are therefore more susceptible
to technological change, have had partic-
ularly slow employment growth in recover-
ies. Finally, we investigate whether routine-
intensive industries have seen more replace-
ment of middle-skill jobs during recessions
and recoveries.
We find that in contrast to the US, recov-
eries in other developed countries as a whole
have not become significantly more jobless
since the late 1980s, even though GDP did
recover more slowly. Routine-intensive in-
dustries did experience deeper recessions
and slower recoveries than other industries,
but this pattern did not change signifi-
cantly after 1985. Finally, we find that
middle-skill employment grew similarly in
routine-intensive industries and other in-
dustries during recent recoveries. Taken to-
gether, this evidence suggests that technol-
ogy is not causing jobless recoveries in de-
veloped countries outside the US.
I. Data
We obtain industry-level real value
added, total hours worked, and hours
worked by skill group, as well as country-
level hours worked, from the EUKLEMS
data set (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009)
1The countries included are Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US.
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and the World Input-Output Database
(Timmer et al., 2015, WIOD).2 EUKLEMS
covers the period 1970-2007 (for the US,
1977-2007) and also includes information on
the share of ICT services in total capital
services. WIOD covers 1995-2011.3
Our source for country-level GDP data,
at both quarterly and annual frequency, is
the OECD (2016). We obtain business-
cycle peak and trough dates from the Eco-
nomic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI).4
For countries not covered by ECRI, we as-
sign peak and trough dates using quarterly
GDP data from the OECD, defining a re-
cession as two or more consecutive quarters
of negative GDP growth.5
Since our industry-level data are only
available at annual frequency, we classify
each country-year as an expansion, reces-
sion, or recovery year, based on quarterly
peak and trough indicators. Our final sam-
ple contains 71 recessions for which we ob-
serve at least the first year of recovery. We
choose 1985 as the last year of our pre-
period, consistent with Jaimovich and Siu
(2014), who consider the 1990 recession in
the US to be the first to feature a jobless
recovery.
One might be concerned that our use
of annual data causes measurement error
in the timing of business cycles. How-
ever, prior literature on jobless recoveries
focusses on cumulative employment growth,
say over four or eight quarters as in Gali,
Smets and Wouters (2012), after a trough.
This suggests that annual data, though ad-
mittedly not ideal, can be used to study job-
less recoveries. Because the distinction of
recession and recovery years may be noisy
in some cases, we report coefficients on indi-
cators for recession years, as well as recov-
ery years, in all our results. Reassuringly,
2EUKLEMS and WIOD provide data on three differ-
ent skill groups: high (college and above), middle (high
school, some college) and low (less than high school).
3We use the more recent WIOD data during years
of overlap with EUKLEMS.
4See their table “Business Cycle Peak and Trough
Dates, 21 Countries, 1948-2015”, available at https:
//www.businesscycle.com/download/report/3723 (ac-
cessed on Nov 1, 2016).
5The countries not covered by ECRI include Den-
mark, Finland, Ireland, and The Netherlands.
for the US we do detect patterns consis-
tent with those documented by Jaimovich
and Siu (2014) in our annual data. Fur-
thermore, there are no significant differ-
ences in the frequency of recession years
(about one in six) or the distribution of
peak and trough quarters, between our pre-
period (1970-1985) and post-period (1986-
2011). It is therefore unlikely that measure-
ment error due to using annual cycle indi-
cators is driving our results.
We measure the extent to which indus-
tries are subject to technological change us-
ing routine intensity (RTI) as constructed
in Autor and Dorn (2013). Consistent with
prior literature, we find routine intensity
to be positively related to the ICT share
in total capital services in 1995: a one-
standard-deviation increase in routine in-
tensity is associated with a 0.2 increase in
the share of ICT in total capital. This rela-
tionship does not vary between the US and
other countries. The most routine-intensive
industries include financial intermediation,
retail trade, and various manufacturing in-
dustries, while the least routine-intensive
industries include agriculture, transporta-
tion, and education.
Further details on data construction, as
well as more extensive results, can be found
in the working paper version (henceforth
WPV) of this paper (Graetz and Michaels,
2017).
II. Results
We begin by examining aggregate
changes in recoveries from recessions. We
do this by estimating regressions of the
form
(1)
∆ log Yct =
d′ctβ1 + x
′
cβ2
+1{t ≥ 1986} × d′ctβ3
+1{t ≥ 1986} × x′cβ4 + εct,
using aggregate level data on annual
changes in outcomes Yct ∈ {GDPct, hoursct}
in country c and year t. The vector dct
collects indicators for year t being a reces-
sion year, a year after a recession, or a year
that comes two years after a recession. The
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matrix xc contains country dummies. We
cluster standard errors by country, using
the small-group adjustment that Stata im-
plements by default (Brewer, Crossley and
Joyce, 2013). To detect any changes in busi-
ness cycles coinciding with the period of
rapid technology adoption after 1985, we
interact all variables with a dummy indi-
cating this later period.
As column (1) of Table 1 shows, em-
ployment growth in the two years after
the trough of a recession was negative dur-
ing the period 1970-1985. After 1985, em-
ployment recoveries were not significantly
slower than in the previous years, although
the point estimates in this later period were
a little lower. But to put these point esti-
mates in context, the next column of Ta-
ble 1 shows that GDP recovery was also
slower in the post-1985 period, especially
in the first year of the recovery. Relative to
GDP growth, there is little to suggest that
employment growth in recent recoveries in
the developed world has been particularly
weak.
Next, we examine the differential be-
haviour of routine-intensive industries over
the business cycle. We are motivated by a
large literature documenting that routine-
intensive jobs have been more exposed
to technological change.6 The focus on
routine-intensive industries is also in the
spirit of Jaimovich and Siu (2014).
To examine whether industries that are
more intensive in routine tasks display a dif-
ferent pattern of recovery from recessions,
we estimate regressions of the form
(2)
∆ log Yict =
d′ctγ1 + RTIi × d′ctγ2 + x′icγ3
+1{t ≥ 1986} × d′ctγ4
+1{t ≥ 1986} × RTIi × d′ctγ5
+1{t ≥ 1986} × x′icγ6 + νict,
where the data are year-on-year changes at
the country-industry level. RTIi is rou-
tine intensity in industry i, standardized
6See Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for an overview,
and more detailed references in Graetz and Michaels
(2017).
to have zero mean and unit variance. The
matrix xic contains country and industry
dummies.7 We continue to cluster stan-
dard errors at the country level. We weight
all industry-level regressions by the within-
country employment share of each country-
industry, averaged over time. Weights sum
up to one within countries, so that each
country receives equal weight, as in our
country-level regressions above.
Column (3) of Table 1 contains our main
result. Employment recovered more slowly
in routine-intensive industries already dur-
ing the early period, and there is no sta-
tistically significant change in this relation-
ship after 1985. The same is true for value
added, as seen in column (4) of Table 1.8
Column (5) and (6) of Table 1 show esti-
mates of the same regressions as in columns
(3) and (4), but this time only for the US.
These results show a picture that is broadly
consistent with Jaimovich and Siu (2014):
in the US, employment and value added
growth were slower in recent recessions, and
even more so in routine-intensive industries.
In other words, the phenomenon of “jobless
recoveries” as observed in the US could be
related to technological change—but, as the
results in the previous columns show, the
same conclusion does not apply outside the
US.
We conduct a series of robustness checks,
which we document in the WPV. These
checks include adding year fixed effects to
the regressions; estimating unweighted re-
gressions; and using EUKLEMS instead
of WIOD for the years when they over-
lap. In all cases the basic picture outlined
above remains unchanged, and there is lit-
tle evidence that routine-intensive indus-
tries experienced more-jobless recoveries af-
ter 1985.
While our main specifications follow the
literature in using industries’ routine inten-
7In the WPV we also report results from specifica-
tions that omit industry dummies and include the non-
interacted routine index instead. They are quantita-
tively very similar to our baseline results.
8For some observations we have data on hours but
not on value added. We show in the WPV that results
for hours are unchanged if we restrict the sample to
observations with non-missing value added.
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sity as a measure of exposure to techno-
logical change, we also consider an alter-
native and more direct measure of technol-
ogy adoption, namely, the share of ICT in
total capital (measured in 1995). The re-
sults, contained in the WPV, show a simi-
lar pattern as before, although there is some
evidence that in recent recessions employ-
ment in ICT-intensive industries grew more
slowly during the first year of recovery (but
not in the second year of recovery). Again,
results for the US when using a direct mea-
sure of ICT adoption, are more consistent
with Jaimovich and Siu (2014) than results
for the whole sample.
In the WPV we also examine industries
that were more exposed to robotization, be-
cause their (pre-robotization) employment
was more concentrated in occupations that
robots could eventually replace (Graetz and
Michaels, 2015). We show that these indus-
tries did not experience deeper recessions
and slower recoveries after 1985.
To shed more light on the differences in
our results between the US and other devel-
oped countries, we also investigate whether
the relationship between long-run employ-
ment growth and industries’ routine inten-
sity differs between countries. We docu-
ment in the WPV that routine intensity was
associated with faster employment growth
across all countries during 1970-1985. Af-
terwards, routine-intensive industries expe-
rienced slower employment growth in the
US, but not in other countries. If tech-
nology were behind jobless recoveries, we
would expect that countries experiencing
a larger degree of routine-biased techno-
logical change, as measured by long-run
employment declines associated with rou-
tine intensity after 1985, should also fea-
ture increasingly slow recoveries in routine-
intensive industries after 1985. However,
we show in the WPV that there is no such
relationship in our data.
Lastly, we examine whether recoveries
from recessions have become particularly
bad for the employment of middle-skill
workers, whose jobs are more intensive
in routine tasks than those of other skill
groups. Detailed results from these exer-
cises are reported in the WPV. We first es-
timate specification (1) separately for high-
skill, middle-skill, and low-skill workers and
find some suggestive evidence that after
1985 recessions became worse for middle-
skill workers. But there is no evidence that
employment changes during recoveries in-
creasingly work against middle-skill work-
ers in particular. We then consider the
possibility that in routine-intensive indus-
tries recoveries worked against middle-skill
workers, estimating specification (2) using
each group’s employment change as out-
comes. Again the results show no evidence
of a worsening in the employment prospects
of middle-skill workers in routine-intensive
industries in more recent recessions.9
III. Discussion
The main conclusion of our paper is that
in developed countries outside the US, mod-
ern technologies are unlikely to be causing
jobless recoveries. This conclusion stems
from our findings that in most developed
countries, recent recoveries are not particu-
larly jobless; that recent recoveries have not
become more jobless in routine-intensive in-
dustries, which are more prone to tech-
nological change; and that middle-skilled
workers are not being differentially hurt
during recent recoveries—both in general
and specifically in routine-intensive indus-
tries.
Our results do, however, pose a puzzle
as to the nature of recent jobless recov-
eries in the US. There are two (and per-
haps more) possible explanations. The first
builds on our finding that across industries
in the US, technological change is associ-
ated with the recent joblessness of recov-
eries, consistent with Jaimovich and Siu
(2014).10 Although secular changes in occu-
pational employment, likely driven by tech-
nology, have been very similar across the
9Even when we examine these results separately
for the US there is still no evidence that middle-
skill employment suffered disproportionately in routine-
intensive industries in recent recessions.
10This is also consistent with Hershbein and Kahn
(2016), who document that skill requirements in vacancy
postings increased more in local labor markets that were
more affected by the Great Recession, and that these
patterns persisted.
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US and other developed countries, there are
aspects of technology adoption that differ—
see for instance Bloom, Sadun and Van
Reenen (2012). Perhaps such differences
could explain the absence of jobless recover-
ies outside the US. The second possible ex-
planation appeals to US-specific policy and
institutional changes. For instance, Mit-
man and Rabinovich (2014) show that un-
employment benefit extensions, which in-
crease workers’ reservation wages, may slow
down employment growth during recover-
ies. Berger (2015) proposes that the substi-
tution of workers during recessions and re-
coveries may have become more pronounced
in recent decades because of the decline of
unions. Establishing the relative merits of
the technology- and policy-based explana-
tions, which of course need not be mutually
exclusive, is a task for future research.
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Table 1—Growth in hours and output over the business cycle, by period and routine intensity
Countries Industries Industries, US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H GDP H VA H VA
1{recession} -1.78 -3.46 -1.74 -3.38 -4.07 -6.80
(0.33) (0.41) (0.28) (0.46) (0.96) (1.85)
1{recovery 1} -1.95 -1.74 -2.00 -1.59 -2.80 -2.01
(0.35) (0.34) (0.38) (0.35) (0.51) (0.97)
1{recovery 2} -0.49 -0.46 -0.58 -0.77 -0.17 0.62
(0.21) (0.36) (0.25) (0.34) (0.45) (0.97)
RTI×1{recession} -0.72 -0.97 -0.50 -0.32
(0.13) (0.22) (1.00) (1.96)
RTI×1{recovery 1} -0.57 -1.43 0.66 1.65
(0.15) (0.54) (0.43) (1.24)
RTI×1{recovery 2} -0.10 -0.38 0.47 -0.84
(0.20) (0.45) (0.43) (1.09)
1{recession}×1{t ≥ 1986} -0.50 -0.43 -0.65 -0.23 2.02 4.74
(0.48) (0.51) (0.47) (0.56) (0.55) (1.30)
1{recovery 1}×1{t ≥ 1986} -0.29 -1.09 -0.44 -1.44 -1.41 -1.74
(0.57) (0.43) (0.58) (0.44) (0.86) (1.14)
1{recovery 2}×1{t ≥ 1986} -0.47 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -2.21 -0.85
(0.43) (0.35) (0.53) (0.38) (0.98) (0.95)
RTI×1{recession}×1{t ≥ 1986} 0.20 -0.39 -0.93 -1.16
(0.22) (0.33) (0.65) (1.56)
RTI×1{recovery 1}×1{t ≥ 1986} -0.27 0.25 -2.01 -3.15
(0.30) (0.54) (0.77) (1.96)
RTI×1{recovery 2}×1{t ≥ 1986} 0.19 0.12 -0.66 -0.59
(0.31) (0.63) (0.92) (0.72)
Observations 690 690 19,320 18,284 952 896
Notes: Indicators for “recession”, “recovery 1”, and “recovery 2” equal one if a given year features a recession,
follows a recession year, or comes two years after a recession year, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) report results
from country-level regressions, while all other columns contain results from industry-level regressions. “H”, “GDP”,
and “VA” refer to hours worked, gross domestic product, and value added, respectively. The dependent variables
are annual changes in the log of these variables, multiplied by 100 so that coefficients are in log points. “RTI” refers
to an index for routine intensity, which is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. Regressions in columns
(1)-(4) control for country fixed effects, and in columns (3)-(6), for industry-fixed effects. All fixed effects are allowed
to vary between pre- and post-period. Robust standard errors, clustered by country (by industry in the last two
columns), in parentheses.
